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Practical Foundations of History Independence
Sumeet Bajaj, Anrin Chakraborti, Radu Sion
Abstract—The way data structures organize data is often a
function of the sequence of past operations. The organization of
data is referred to as the data structure’s state, and the sequence
of past operations constitutes the data structure’s history. A data
structure state can therefore be used as an oracle to derive
information about its history. As a result, for history-sensitive
applications, such as privacy in e-voting, incremental signature
schemes, and regulatory compliant data retention; it is imperative
to conceal historical information contained within data structure
states.
Data structure history can be hidden by making data struc-
tures history independent. In this paper, we explore how to
achieve history independence.
We observe that current history independence notions are
significantly limited in number and scope. There are two existing
notions of history independence – weak history independence
(WHI) and strong history independence (SHI). WHI does not
protect against insider adversaries and SHI mandates canonical
representations, resulting in inefficiency.
We postulate the need for a broad, encompassing notion of
history independence, which can capture WHI, SHI, and a broad
spectrum of new history independence notions. To this end, we
introduce ∆history independence (∆HI), a generic game-based
framework that is malleable enough to accommodate existing
and new history independence notions.
As an essential step towards formalizing ∆HI, we explore the
concepts of abstract data types, data structures, machine models,
memory representations and history independence. Finally, to
bridge the gap between theory and practice, we outline a general
recipe for building end-to-end, history independent systems and
demonstrate the use of the recipe in designing two history
independent file systems.
Index Terms—History independence, data structures, regula-
tory compliance
I. Introduction
Data structures are commonly used constructs to store and
retrieve data in systems. However, data structures carry more
information than the raw data they organize. One aspect of
this information is the history leading to the data structure’s
current state [1].
Concealing historical information contained within data
structure states is necessary for incremental signature schemes
[2] and for privacy in voting systems [2], [3], [4], [5].
Therefore, the need arises for data structures that reveal no
information about the history that led to their current state
other than what is inherently visible from the data. History
independence [6] has been devised to enable the design of such
data structures and they are termed as “history independent
data structures”.
We have identified the role of history independence in
designing systems that are compliant with data retention
regulations [7]. Retention regulations desire that once data
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is deleted, no evidence about the past existence of deleted
data must be recoverable. Such a deletion cannot be achieved
by simply overwriting data as in secure deletion [8]. This
is because overwriting does not eliminate the effects that
previous existence of delete data leaves on the current system
state. Even after secure deletion, the current state can be used
as an oracle to derive information about the past existence of
deleted records. For example, the current organization of data
blocks on disk is a function of the sequence of previous writes
to file system or to database search indexes. The organization
could be different depending on whether a particular record
was deleted in the past or was never inserted in the data set.
Therefore, questions about history, such as “was John’s record
ever in the HIV patients’ dataset” can be answered much more
accurately than guessing by simply looking at the search index
organization on disk since the organization could be different
depending on whether John has previously been in the data set
or not. The inference of past existence of deleted data violates
data retention regulations.
However, in order to architect systems with history indepen-
dent characteristics and to prove history independence, we
need a formal notion of data structures, of data structure
states, and of history independence itself. In this paper we
first formalize all necessary concepts and understand history
independence from a theoretical perspective (Sections III - V).
Then, in Section VIII and IX, we use the theoretical results
to design two history independent file systems.
II. A Quick Informal Look at HI
History independence (HI) is concerned with the historical
information preserved within data structure states. The pre-
served history may be illicitly used by adversaries to violate
regulatory compliance. For example, an adversary may breach
data retention laws by recovering deleted data. Therefore, to
understand history independence, we need to specify what
we mean by state, what we mean by history, and what an
adversary can do.
What is state?
A data structure’s state is an organization of data on a physical
medium such as memory or disk.
What is history?
History is the sequence of operations that led to the current
data structure state.
What is the threat?
For many existing data structures, the current state is a function
of both data and history [1]. Hence, by analyzing the current
state an adversary can derive the state’s history. Depending
on the application the historical information includes the
following:
• Evidence of past existence of deleted data [10].
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Fig. 1. A history dependent hash table organizes the same data set differently
depending on the sequence of operations (i.e., history). In this example, the
hash table uses linear probing [9]. The number of hash table buckets is 3 and
the hash function is modulo 3.
• The order in which votes were cast in a voting application
[2], [3].
• Intermediate versions of published documents [2].
To illustrate, consider the sample hash table data structure
of Figure 1. The sample hash table organizes the same data
set differently depending on the sequence of operations used.
Hence, an adversary that looks at the system memory can
potentially detect which operation sequence was used to get
to the current hash table state.
What is history independence?
History independence is a characteristic of a data structure.
A data structure is said to be history independent if from
the adversary’s point of view, the current data structure state
is a function of data only and not of history. Thus, the
current state of a history independent data structure reveals no
information to the adversary about its history other than what
is inherently visible from the data itself. We emphasize that
history independence is concerned with historical information
that is revealed from data organization and not from the data.
Are there different kinds of history independence?
Naor et al. [11] introduced two notions of history indepen-
dence – weak history independence (WHI) and strong history
independence (SHI).
WHI and SHI differ in the number of data structure states an
adversary is permitted to observe. Under WHI, an adversary
is permitted to observe only the current data structure state.
For example, as in case of a stolen laptop. Under SHI, an
adversary is permitted several observations of data structure
states throughout a sequence of operations. For example, as
in case of an insider adversary who can obtain a periodic
memory dump. For SHI, the adversary should be unable to
identify which sequence of operations was applied between
any two adjacent observations.
A. Our Contributions
WHI assumes a weak adversary while SHI is a very powerful
notion of history independence, secure even against a com-
putationally unbounded adversary [1]. Currently, applications
are restricted to using data structures with either WHI or
SHI characteristics. However, applications that do not fit into
either WHI or SHI do exist. For example, a journaling system
that reveals no historical information other than the last k
operations1. Further, WHI does not protect against insider
adversaries and SHI results in inefficiency [12]. Hence, there
is a necessity for new notions of history independence targeted
towards specific application scenarios.
In this paper we take the first steps towards better under-
standing the history independence spectrum and its applicabil-
ity to systems. The contributions of this paper are:
• The exploration of abstract data types, data structures,
machine models, and memory representations (Section
III). This is an essential step towards formalizing history
independence.
• New game-based definitions of weak and strong history
independence (Sections IV-A and IV-B) that are more
appropriate for the security community as compared to
existing terminology [11], [6].
• A new notion of history independence termed ∆ his-
tory independence (∆HI). ∆HI centers around a generic
game-based definition of history independence and is
malleable enough to accommodate WHI, SHI, and a
broad spectrum of new history independence notions
(Section V-A). In addition, ∆HI helps to quantify the his-
tory revealed or hidden by existing data structures most of
which have been designed without history independence
in mind.
• A general recipe for designing history independent sys-
tems and the recipe’s use in designing a history indepen-
dent file system (Section VIII).
• The design and evaluation of delete agnostic file system
(DAFS). In DAFS, we re-design the file system layer to
support new history independence notions. DAFS also
increases file system resilience via journaling in the
presence of history independence.
III. Preliminaries
Formalizing history independence requires an understanding
of data structures. A data structure itself can be viewed as an
implementation of an abstract data type (ADT) on a machine
model [1]. An abstract data type (ADT) is a specification
of operations for data organization while a machine model
represents a physical computing machine.
In the following, we provide an overview of ADTs, data
structures, machine models, and memory representations as
proposed in [1] that are relevant to history independence. Then,
in Section IV we formalize history independence.
A. Abstract Data Type (ADT)
The specification of data organization techniques is often done
via abstract data types. The key characteristic of an ADT
is that it specifies operations independently of any specific
implementation. We use the concept proposed by Golovin et
al. [1], wherein an ADT is considered as a set of states together
with a set of operations. Each operation maps the current state
to a new state.
Definition 1. Abstract Data Type (ADT)
An ADT A is a pentuple (S, sφ,O,Γ,Ψ), where S is a set of
1We give additional examples in Section V-A.
3states; sφ ∈ S is the initial state; O is a set of operations; Γ
is a set of inputs; Ψ is a set of outputs; and each operation
o ∈ O is a function 2 o : S × Γo → S × Ψo, where Γo ⊆ Γ
and Ψo ⊆ Ψ.
The ADT is initialized to state sφ. When an operation o ∈ O
with input i ∈ Γo is applied to an ADT state s1, the ADT
outputs τ ∈ Ψo and transitions to a state s2. The transition
from s1 to s1 is denoted as o(s1, i)→ (s2, τ).
The necessity of ADTs. History independence requires that
from an adversary’s point of view, the current data structure
state is a function of data only and not of history. In the
context of history independence, an ADT models the history
revealed by data only. Since we view a data structure as an
ADT implementation (Section III-C), the ADT helps to clearly
identify what the data structure is permitted or not permitted to
reveal about past operations. Any history revealed by an ADT
state can be revealed by the corresponding data structure state.
Any history hidden by an ADT state must be hidden by the
corresponding data structure state.
ADT as a graph. We can imagine the ADT to be a directed
graph G, where each vertex represents an ADT state and each
edge is labeled with an ADT operation along with an ADT
input and an ADT output. The label for an edge between
two vertices represents the operation that causes the transition
between the corresponding states. We call the graph G, the
state transition graph of the ADT.
Viewing an ADT as a graph will be particularly useful when
we take a deeper look into history independence in Section
III-D.
B. Models of Execution
An ADT is only a specification of operations for organizing
data. For more practical use, such as for efficiency analysis,
concrete implementations of the ADT operations are required.
ADT implementations are provided via programs that
can be executed on a given machine model. An ADT’s
implementation in a given machine model is a data structure
(Section III-C).
RAM Model of Execution. The RAM model of execution
models a traditional serial computer. The model consists of
two components, a central processing unit (CPU) and a random
access memory (RAM). Both the CPU and RAM are finite
state machines (FSM) [13].
The RAM consists of m = 2u storage locations. Each
location is a b-bit word and has a unique log2m bit address
associated with it3. Two operations are permitted on a storage
location in the RAM. First, a load operation to access the b-bit
bit word stored at the location. Second, a store operation that
copies a given b-bit word to the location. Typically, the b-bit
words are copied to or copied from CPU registers.
The CPU consists of n b-bit registers and operates on a
fetch-and-execute cycle [13]. The CPU has an associated set of
2For brevity, we model each ADT operation with an input and an output.
ADT operations may accept no inputs or produce no outputs. Hence, an ADT
operation can also be modeled as the following functions: o : S → S ,
o : S → S ×Ψo, or o : S × Γo → S .
3This a bounded-memory RAM.
instructions that it can perform. CPU instructions are specified
in a programming language. A program in a RAM model is
a finite sequence of programming language instructions.
A machine model can itself be considered as an ADT [1].
In this case, the set of ADT states is the set of all machine
states, and the set of ADT operations is the set of all machine
programs. For the RAM model, the set of ADT states, the
set of inputs, and the set of outputs are all represented as bit
strings.
Definition 2. Bounded RAM Machine Model
A bounded RAM machine model M with m b-bit memory
words and n b-bit CPU registers is a pentuple (S, sφ,P ,Γ,Ψ),
where S = {0, 1}b(m+n) is the set of machine states; sφ ∈ S is
the initial state; P is the set of all programs ofM; Γ = {0, 1}∗
is a set of inputs; Ψ = {0, 1}∗ is a set of outputs; and each
program p ∈ P is a function p : S × Γp → S × Ψp, where
Γp ⊆ Γ and Ψp ⊆ Ψ.
M is initialized to state sφ. If a program p ∈ P with input
i ∈ Γp is executed by the CPU when M is in state s1, M
outputs τ ∈ Ψp and transitions to a state s2. The transition
from s1 to s2 is denoted as p(s1, i)→ (s2, τ).
C. Data Structure
An implementation for an ADT in a given machine model is
obtained as follows.
• A machine representation is chosen for each ADT input
and output.
• For each ADT operation a machine program is selected
that provides the functionality desired from the ADT
operation.
• A unique machine state is selected to represent the initial
ADT state.
We encapsulate the above steps in the following data structure
definition.
Definition 3. Data Structure
A data structure implementation of an ADT A in a bounded
RAM machine model M is a quadruple (α, β, γ, sM0 ),
where A = (S, sφ,O,Γ,Ψ) as per definition 1, M =
(SM, sMφ ,P
M,ΓM,ΨM) as per definition 2, α : Γ′ → ΓM,
β : Ψ′ → ΨM, γ : O → PM, sM0 ∈ S
M
, Γ′ ⊆ Γ and
Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ.
α is a mapping from ADT inputs to machine inputs. That
is, for any ADT input i, α(i) is the machine representation
of the input. Similarly, β is the mapping from ADT outputs
to machine outputs. γ is the mapping from ADT operations
to machine programs. For an ADT operation o, γ(o) is the
machine program implementing o. Finally, just as the ADT A
is initialized to a unique state sφ, a unique machine state sM0
is selected to represent the initial data structure state.
Data Structure State. A data structure state is a machine
state. The set of all data structure states consists of all machine
states that are reachable from the initial data structure state
via execution of machine programs implementing the ADT
operations.
State Transition Graph For Data Structure. A data structure
can be considered to be a directed graph G, where each vertex
4TABLE I
SAMPLE PATHS FROM ADT AND DATA STRUCTURE STATE TRANSITION
GRAPHS .
Path From
Figure
pA = sφ → {1} → {1, 3} → {1, 3, 6} 2(a)
p′A = sφ → {1} → {1, 6} → {1, 3, 6} 2(a)
pD = s
M
φ
→<< , 1, >>→<< 3, 1, >>→<< 3, 1, 6 >> 2(b)
p′D = s
M
φ
→<< , 1, >>→<< 6, 1, >>→<< 6, 1, 3 >> 2(b)
represents a data structure state and each edge is labeled with a
machine program implementing an ADT operation along with
a machine input and a machine output. The label for an edge
between two vertices represents the program that causes the
transition between the corresponding states. We call the graph
G, the state transition graph of the data structure.
D. A Semi-Formal Look At HI
The non-isomorphism problem. In Section II we introduced
the two existing history independence notions – weak history
independence (WHI) and strong history independence (SHI)4.
Non-isomorphism between the state transition graph of an
ADT and of its data structure implementation breaks SHI.
WHI on the other hand can be achieved even when the ADT
and data structure state transition graphs are non-isomorphic.
First, we look at how non-isomorphism breaks SHI and then
we discuss how to achieve WHI in the presence of non-
isomorphism.
Why non-isomorphism breaks SHI? Non-isomorphism and
thus the need for SHI arises when an ADT state has multiple
memory representations 5. We will precisely define memory
representations for ADT states in Section III-E. For now, it
suffices to say the following: A memory representation for an
ADT state that is reachable from the initial ADT state via a
sequence of ADT operations is the machine state reachable
from the initial data structure state via the corresponding
program sequence. For example, in Figure 2, the data structure
states << 3, 1, 6 >> and << 6, 1, 3 >> are memory
representations of the ADT state {1, 3, 6}.
To illustrate how non-isomorphism breaks SHI, consider the
example graphs from Figure 2, example paths from Table I,
and an adversary with access to the initial ADT state sφ,
the initial data structure state sMφ , the current ADT state
{1, 3, 6}, and the current data structure state which is either
<< 3, 1, 6 >> or << 6, 1, 3 >>.
By looking at the ADT states alone, the adversary cannot
determine which sequence of ADT operations was used to
arrive at the current ADT state {1, 3, 6}. This is because there
are two paths pA and p′A between the ADT states sφ and
{1, 3, 6}. Moreover, the ADT states carry no information about
the exact path used to transition from sφ to {1, 3, 6}. Hence,
4Both WHI and SHI are formalized in Section IV.
5Many existing data structures have this property and are hence, not
history independent. Common examples include the linked list, hash tables
and B-Trees. In these data structures different insertion order of the same
set of data elements (i.e., the same ADT state) results in different memory
representations.
the data alone gives the adversary no advantage in guessing
which sequence of ADT operations was applied in the past.
Now, by looking at the current data structure state, the
adversary can clearly identify which sequence of machine
programs was used to arrive at the current data structure state.
The current data structure state is either << 3, 1, 6 >> or
<< 6, 1, 3 >>. There is a unique path from initial data
structure state sMφ to each of the states << 3, 1, 6 >> and
<< 6, 1, 3 >>. Hence, by observing the current data structure
state, the adversary can identity whether path pD or path
p′D was used to transition from state sMφ to the current data
structure state. Identification of the path in the data structure
state transition graph informs the adversary of the program
sequence used. Knowledge of the program sequence used
in-turn tells the adversary the sequence of ADT operations
used. In conclusion, the data structure implementation gives
the adversary an advantage in guessing the history of past
execution, thereby breaking history independence.
How can we achieve history independence? The two known
ways to make data history independent:
1) For SHI, make the ADT and the data structure state
transition graphs isomorphic:
Data structures with state transition graphs isomorphic
to their ADT’s state transition graph are referred to as
canonically represented data structures. We discuss the
necessity of canonical representations for SHI in Section
IV-D. SHI implies WHI.
2) For WHI, make the data structure state transitions ran-
domized:
Randomization here refers to the selection of the data
structure state representing the corresponding ADT state.
To illustrate, consider the example graphs from Fig-
ure 2. Both data structure states << 3, 1, 6 >> and
<< 6, 1, 3 >> are valid memory representations of the
ADT state {1, 3, 6}. For WHI, the choice between data
structure states << 3, 1, 6 >> and << 6, 1, 3 >> to
represent the ADT state {1, 3, 6} must be random.
As shown in Figure 3, randomization translates to ad-
dition of new paths in the data structure state transition
graph to ensure the following: For any two ADT states s0
and s1, if there is a path in the ADT state transition graph
between s0 and s1, then, there must be a path from all
memory representations of ADT state s0 to all memory
representations of ADT state s1 in the data structure’s
state transition graph. The choice of path in the data
structure state transition graph between representations
of ADT states s0 and s1 is then made at random.
From the adversary’s point of view randomization makes
all memory representations of an ADT state equally likely
to occur. Hence, observation of a specific representation
gives the adversary no advantage in guessing the sequence
of machine programs that led to the current data structure
state. Since the adversary cannot identify the sequence of
machine programs used, the adversary is also unable to
identify the sequence of ADT operations that led to the
current ADT state.
5{4}
sϕ
{4, 7}
{1}
{1,6}
{1,3}
{1,3,6}
insert(4)
insert(1)
insert(3)
insert(6)
insert(6)
insert(3)
insert(7)
delete(4)
{7}
search(7)/7
(a)
<<_,4,_>>
sϕ
<<_,4,7>>
<<_,1,_>> <<6,1,_>>
<<3,1,_>>
<<6,1,3>>
γ(insert)(α(4))
γ(insert)(α(1))
γ(insert)(α(3))
γ(insert)(α(6))
γ(insert)(α(6))
γ(insert)(α(3))
γ(insert)(α(7))
γ(delete)(α(4))
<<_,_,7>>
M
<<3,1,6>>
γ(search)(α(7))/β(7)
(b)
Fig. 2. Example of non-isomorphism between ADT and data structure state transition graphs. (a) Partial state transition graph for sample hash table ADT.
(b) Partial state transition graph for sample array-based hash table data structure implementation using linear probing. Number of hash table buckets is 3 and
the hash function is h(key) = key % 3. γ(insert), γ(search) and γ(delete) denote the machine programs implementing the ADT operations insert, search
and delete, respectively. o(i)/t denotes that ADT operation o takes input i and produces output t. Similarly, γ(o)(α(i))/β(t) denotes that program γ(o)
takes input α(i) and produces output β(t). α(i) and β(t) are the machine representations of the ADT input i and ADT output t, respectively. Note that the
vertices in figure (b) represent data structure states. In the RAM model these will be bit strings. However, to convey data semantics we denote the hash table
array as << a0, a1, a2 >>, where a0, a1, and a2 are elements at buckets 0 , 1 and 2, respectively. Underscore denotes an empty bucket. Highlighted paths
are referenced in Table I, and in Section III-D
.
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Fig. 3. Using randomization to achieve history independence. The dotted
lines indicate new transitions added to the hash table data structure state
transition graph. Amongst all edges with the same starting node and the same
label, the choice of edge for state transition is made at random.
E. Memory Representations
In the discussion of nonisomorphism and history independence
above, we informally introduced memory representations for
ADT states. We also showed that history independence comes
into picture when an ADT state has multiple memory represen-
tations. In short, the memory representation for an ADT state
that is reachable from the initial ADT state via a sequence of
ADT operations, is the machine state reachable from the initial
data structure state via the corresponding program sequence.
We formally define memory representations here and use them
later in Section IV for the game-based definitions of history
independence.
Let δ = 〈o1, o2, ..., on〉 be a sequence of ADT operations
and I = 〈i1, i2, ..., in〉 be a sequence of ADT inputs. We
denote by O(δ, s0, I) the application of the ADT operation
sequence δ on ADT state s0.
O(δ, s0, I) =


s0 if|δ| = 0
(sn, τn)|ok(sk−1, ik)→ (sk , τk);
1 ≤ k ≤ n otherwise
If δ is empty no state transition occurs and no outputs are
produced. For nonempty sequence δ, sn and τn denote the
ADT state and the ADT output, respectively, produced by the
final operation in sequence δ.
To summarize, we denote by O(δ, s0, I)→ (sn, τn) that the
ADT operation sequence δ when applied to the ADT state s0
with ADT input sequence I , results in the ADT state sn and
ADT output τn.
Now, let δM = χ(δ) = 〈γ(o1), γ(o2), ..., γ(on)〉 be a se-
quence of machine programs corresponding to the ADT oper-
ation sequence δ. γ(ok) is the machine program implementing
the ADT operation ok. Then, we denote by OM(δM, sM0 , I)
the application of program sequence δM on a machine state
sM0 .
OM(δM, sM
0
, I) =


sM
0
if |δM| = 0
(sMn , β(τn))
|γ(ok)(s
M
k−1, α(ik))→ {s
M
k
, β(τk)};
1 ≤ k ≤ n otherwise
Here, α(i) and β(τ) denote the machine representations
for an ADT input i and an ADT output τ , respectively. sMn
and β(τn) are the machine state and the machine output,
respectively, produced by the final program in sequence δM.
In summary, we denote by OM(δM, sM0 , I) → (sMn , τMn )
that a program sequence δM when applied to a machine state
sM0 with an ADT input sequence I , results in a machine state
sMn and a machine output τMn .
Definition 4. Memory Representations
The set of memory representations of an ADT state s, denoted
by m(s), is the set of data structure states, defined as
m(s) =


sM
0
if s = sφ
sM | OM(δM
k
, sM
0
, Ik)→ {s
M, β(τ|δk|)};
1 ≤ k ≤ n otherwise
where, sM0 is the initial data structure state; I1, I2, ..., In
are sequences of ADT inputs; δ1, δ2, ..., δn are ADT operation
sequences, each of which when applied to the initial ADT
state sφ results in state s, that is O(δk, sφ, Ik) → (s, τk);
δMk = χ(δk) denotes the program sequence corresponding to
ADT operation sequence δk; |Ik| = |δk|; 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Here m is the mapping m : S → 2SD , where S is the set
of all ADT states, SD is the set of all data structure states,
and 2SD denotes the power set of SD .
1) Dealing With Infinite ADT State Space
The set of machine states for the bounded RAM model is
finite since there are finite number of available bits. Hence, a
6data structure implementation on a bounded RAM model can
only have a finite number of data structure states. The set of
ADT states on the other hand can be infinite. For an ADT
with infinite states, a data structure implementation will be
unable to uniquely represent all the ADT states. The case of
infinite ADT states is of particular importance for canonically
represented data structures that require the state transition
graphs of the ADT and of the data structure to be isomorphic,
that is, each ADT state has a unique memory representation.
We will look at canonical representations in detail within
the context of history independence in Section IV-D. Here,
we list two work-arounds to dealing with infinite ADT state
space.
1) Redefine the ADT, such that the number of ADT states
is less than or equal to the number of machine states.
2) Design each machine program implementing an ADT
operation, such that the program produces a special output
when an ADT state cannot be represented using the
available machine bits. For example, an out-of-memory
error.
IV. History Independence
Now that we are equipped with the necessary concepts (ADT,
RAM machine model, data structure, and memory representa-
tions), we proceed to formalize history independence. We give
new game-based definitions for both WHI and SHI (Sections
IV-A and IV-A). The new definitions are equivalent to exist-
ing proposals [2], [6] but more appropriate for the security
community since they follow the game-based construction of
semantic security. Further, our new definitions naturally extend
to accommodate other notions of history independence beyond
WHI and SHI.
A. Weak History Independence (WHI)
WHI was introduced for scenarios wherein an adversary
observes only the current data structure state. For example,
as in the case of a stolen laptop.
Informally, a data structure is said to be weakly history
independent if for any two sequences of ADT operations δ1
and δ2, that take the ADT from initialization to a state s,
observation of any memory representation of state s gives the
adversary no advantage in guessing whether sequence δ1 or
δ2 was used to get to s.
We define weak history independence (WHI) by the follow-
ing game:
Let A = (S, sφ,O,Γ,Ψ) be an ADT, M =
(SM, sM
φ
,PM,ΓM,ΨM) be a bounded RAM machine model, and
D = (α, β, γ, sM
0
) be a data structure implementing A in M, as per
definitions 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
1) A probabilistic polynomial time-bounded adversary selects the
following: An ADT state s; two sequences of ADT operations δ0
and δ1; and two sequences of ADT inputs I0 and I1; such that
O(δ0, sφ, I0)→ (s, τ) and O(δ1, sφ, I1)→ (s, τ). Both δ1 and
δ2 take the ADT from the initial state sφ to state s producing the
same output τ .
2) The adversary sends s, δ0, δ1, I0 and I1 to the challenger.
3) The challenger flips a fair coin c ∈ {0, 1} and computes
OM(δMc , s
M
0
, Ic) → (sM, τM), where δMc = χ(δc) and
τM = β(τ). That is, the challenger applies the program sequence
δMc corresponding to the ADT operation sequence δc to the
data structure initialization state sM
0
, resulting in a memory
representation sM of ADT state s and a machine output τM.
4) The challenger sends the memory representation sM to the
adversary.
5) The adversary outputs c′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary wins the game if c′ = c.
D is said to be weakly history independent if the advantage of
the adversary for winning the game, defined as |Pr[c′ = c] − 1/2|
is negligible (where “negligible” is defined over any implementation-
specific security parameters of the programs in PM).6
Since WHI permits the adversary to make a single obser-
vation, the adversary is allowed to choose the end state only
in step 1. The starting state for the chosen ADT operation
sequences is always the initial ADT state sφ. Recall from the
data structure definition (Section III-C) that the initial ADT
state has a fixed memory representation, which is the initial
data structure state sM0 . Hence, in step 3, the challenger applies
the adversary-selected sequence to the memory representation
sM0 of sφ.
If the adversary is able to identify the ADT operation
sequence chosen by the challenger in step 3, then the adversary
wins the game. Winning the game implies the adversary was
able to determine the operation sequence that led to the current
ADT state by observing the state’s memory representation,
thereby breaking WHI.
B. Strong History Independence (SHI)
Unlike WHI, SHI is applicable when an adversary can observe
multiple memory representations throughout a sequence of
operations For example, as in case of an insider who can obtain
a periodic memory dump. SHI requires that the adversary must
not gain any additional information about the sequence of
operations between any two adjacent observations than what
is inherently available from the corresponding ADT states.
Informally, a data structure is said to be strongly history
independent if for any two sequences of ADT operations δ1
and δ2, that take the ADT from a state s1 to a state s2,
observations of any memory representations of states s1 and s2
give the adversary no advantage in guessing whether sequence
δ1 or δ2 was used to go from s1 to s2.
We define strong history independence (SHI) by the follow-
ing game:
Let A = (S, sφ,O,Γ,Ψ) be an ADT, M =
(SM, sM
φ
,PM,ΓM,ΨM) be a bounded RAM machine model, and
D = (α, β, γ, sM
0
) be a data structure implementing A in M, as per
definitions 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
1) A probabilistic polynomial time-bounded adversary selects the
following.
• Two ADT states s1 and s2; two sequences of ADT operations
δ0 and δ1; and two sequences of ADT inputs I0 and I1; such
that O(δ0, s1, I0) → (s2, τ) and O(δ1, s1, I1) → (s2, τ).
6For example PRNG seeds when using randomization, or keys when using
encryption.
7Both δ1 and δ2 take the ADT from state s1 to state s2
producing the same output τ .
• A memory representation sM
1
of ADT state s1.
2) The adversary sends s1, sM1 , δ0, δ1, I0 and I1 to the challenger.
3) The challenger flips a fair coin c ∈ {0, 1} and computes
OM(δMc , s
M
1
, Ic) → (sM2 , τ
M), where δMc = χ(δc) and
τM = β(τ). That is, the challenger applies the program sequence
δMc corresponding to the ADT operation sequence δc to the data
structure state sM
1
, resulting in a memory representation sM
2
of
state s2 and a machine output τM.
4) The challenger sends the memory representation sM
2
to the
adversary.
5) The adversary outputs c′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary wins the game if c′ = c.
D is said to be strongly history independent if the advantage of
the adversary for winning the game, defined as |Pr[c′ = c] − 1/2|
is negligible (where “negligible” is defined over any implementation-
specific security parameters of the programs in PM).
Winning the game means that the adversary was able to
determine the operation sequence that took the ADT from state
s1 to state s2, thereby breaking SHI.
SHI implies WHI. If the ADT state s1 chosen by the
adversary in step 1 is the initial ADT state sφ, then the SHI
game reduces to the WHI game of Section IV-A.
C. Equivalence to Existing Definitions
WHI and SHI were first introduced by Naor et al. [11]. Later,
Hartline et al. [6] introduced new definitions for WHI and SHI.
However, Hartline et al. showed that their definitions although
less complex are equivalent to the ones proposed by Naor
et al. Our game-based definitions of WHI and SHI (Sections
IV-A and IV-B) differ slightly from the definitions by Hartline
et al. Specifically, Hartline et al. assume a computationally
unbounded adversary. We address history independence in the
presence of computationally bounded adversaries to be more
in-line with reality. Further, new definitions were necessary to
overcome impreciseness in existing definitions and to develop
a framework for new history independence notions beyond
WHI and SHI. We detail in the following.
Hartline et al. defined weak history independence as follows.
Definition 5. Weak History Independence (WHI)
A data structure implementation is weakly history independent
if, for any two sequences of operations X and Y that take the
data structure from initialization to state A, the distribution
over memory after X is performed is identical to the distribu-
tion after Y. That is:
(φ
X
−→ A) ∧ (φ
Y
−→ A) =⇒ ∀ a ∈ A, Pr
[
φ
X
−→ a
]
= Pr
[
φ
Y
−→ a
]
In the above definition, φ X−→ B denotes that a operation
sequence X when applied to the initial state φ, results in
state A. The notation a ∈ A means than a is a memory
representation of state A. Pr
[
φ
X
−→ a
]
denotes the probability
that a sequence X when applied to initial state φ, results in
representation a.
Reconciling terminology
Hartline et al. do not formalize the concepts of data struc-
ture, data structure state and memory representations. A data
structure’s state is referred to as the data structure’s content.
Memory representation of a data structure state is the physical
contents of memory that represent that state. We note that Naor
et al. also used the same terminology in their definitions.
The WHI definition by Hartline et al. is imprecise in the
following.
• Operation inputs and outputs are not considered.
• The same operation sequences are considered applicable
to both data structure states and to memory represen-
tations. The mechanisms for the applicability are not
specified.
• The connection between a data structure’s state and the
state’s memory representations is not precisely specified.
Following Golovin et al. [1] we use the ADT concept to
model logical states (or content) and define a data structure
as an ADT’s implementation (Sections III-A - III-C). A
data structure state is therefore the memory representation of
an ADT state. Separating ADT and data structure concepts
enables us to precisely define memory representations (Section
III-E) for various machine models; understand history inde-
pendence from the perspective of state transition graphs; and
to build a framework for defining new history independence
notions other than SHI and WHI (Section V).
To summarize the differences in terminology, what Hartline
et al. refer to as data structure state in definition 6 is an
ADT state in our model. Further, we refer to a memory
representation in definition 6 as a data structure state.
For WHI, Hartline et al. require a data structure implemen-
tation to satisfy the following:
(φ
X
−→ A) ∧ (φ
Y
−→ A) =⇒ ∀a ∈ A,Pr
[
φ
X
−→ a
]
=
Pr
[
φ
Y
−→ a
]
Our game-based definition of WHI poses the following
slightly relaxed requirement:
(φ
X
−→ A) ∧ (φ
Y
−→ A) =⇒ ∀a ∈ A, |Pr
[
φ
X
−→
a
]
− Pr
[
φ
Y
−→ a
]
| is negligible
We will show that the game-based WHI definition (Section
IV-A) is equivalent to statement IV-C, that is, a data structure
preserves WHI only if statement IV-C is true. However, before
we show the equivalence we point out the necessity for the
difference between conditions IV-C and IV-C.
As discussed in Section III-D, there are two known ways to
achieve history independence. The first way is to make the
ADT and data structure state transition graphs isomorphic.
The second way is to make the data structure state transition
graph randomized. The requirement for identical memory
distributions as per statement IV-C rules out the use of ran-
domization to achieve history independence7. A randomized
data structure implementation will rely on pseudo random
generators. The security of pseudo random generators relies
on computational indistinguishability. Therefore, the relaxed
7The use of randomization to achieve weak history independence is
discussed in Section IV-E.
8requirement of negligibility introduced in statement IV-C is in
fact not a limitation, but rather a reconciliation of the definition
by Hartline et al. with reality where we have computationally
bounded adversaries.
Although Naor et al. proposed a WHI definition that re-
quires identical distributions, they also used randomization to
design a history independent data structure.
Equivalence of WHI definitions
We now show that our gamed-based WHI definition (Sec-
tion IV-A) is equivalent to a WHI definition based on statement
IV-C.
We rewrite statement IV-C for consistent notations as fol-
lows.
(sφ
δ0−→ s) ∧ (sφ
δ1−→ s) =⇒ ∀sM ∈ s, |Pr
[
sMφ
δM
0−→
sM
]
− Pr
[
sMφ
δM
1−→ sM
]
| is negligible
Here, δ0 and δ1 are two ADT operation sequences that take
the ADT from initial state sφ to state s. sφ and sMφ are the
initial ADT and the initial data structure states, respectively.
δM0 and δM1 are the machine programs corresponding to ADT
operation sequences δ0 and δ1, respectively.
History independence only considers cases where the con-
dition (sφ
δ0−→ s)∧ (sφ
δ1−→ s) is true, that is, both sequences
δ0 and δ1 take the ADT to the same end state s. Otherwise,
the ADT states themselves reveal history.
We therefore have two cases to consider
Case 1: The distributions are computationally distinguish-
able, that is,
∃sM ∈ s such that |Pr
[
sMφ
δM
0−→ sM
]
− Pr
[
sMφ
δM
1−→
sM
]
| is non− negligible.
Now consider the following adversarial strategy. Given a
data structure state sM in step 4 of the WHI game, the
adversary outputs c such that δMc has a higher probability
of producing sM. For such an adversarial strategy
∣
∣Pr[c′ =
c] − 12
∣
∣ is non-negligible for some sM. Therefore, the data
structure implementation does not preserve WHI.
Case 2: The distributions are computationally indistinguish-
able, that is,
∀sM ∈ s, |Pr
[
sMφ
δM
0−→ sM
]
− Pr
[
sMφ
δM
1−→
sM
]
| is negligible
In this case, from a computationally bounded adversary’s
perspective, the representation sM received in step 4 of the
WHI game is equally likely to have been produced by either
δM0 or δ
M
1 . Hence, observation of a data structure state gives
the adversary a negligible advantage in guessing c. The data
structure implementation therefore preserves WHI.
Equivalence of SHI definitions
For strong history independence Hartline et al. proposed the
following definition.
Definition 6. Strong History Independence (SHI)
A data structure implementation is strongly history indepen-
dent if, for any two (possibly empty) sequences of operations
X and Y that take a data structure in state A to state B, the
distribution over representations of B after X is performed on
a representation a is identical to the distribution after Y is
performed on a. That is:
(A
X
−→ B) ∧ (A
Y
−→ B) =⇒ ∀ a ∈ A, ∀ b ∈ B, Pr
[
a
X
−→
b
]
= Pr
[
a
Y
−→ b
]
In the above definition, A X−→ B denotes that a operation
sequence X when applied to state A, results in state B. The
notation a ∈ A means than a is a memory representation
of state A. Pr
[
a
X
−→ b
]
denotes the probability that a
sequence X when applied to memory representation a, results
in representation b.
Similar to the case for WHI, our game-based SHI definition
(Section IV-B) differs from the above definition only by
relaxing the requirement for identical distributions. That is,
for SHI, we require the following:
(A
X
−→ B) ∧ (A
Y
−→ B) =⇒ ∀ a ∈ A, ∀ b ∈ B, |Pr
[
a
X
−→
b
]
- Pr
[
a
Y
−→ b
]
| is negligible
The equivalence of SHI definitions follows similarly to the
case of WHI.
Summary of Differences
The main differences between our definitions and the the
definitions by Hartline et al. are the following
• The definitions by Hartline et al. are imprecise about the
concepts of data structures, states, and memory represen-
tations. We precisely formalize all of these concepts.
• Hartline et al. do not consider the case of computationally
bounded adversaries. We permit computationally bounded
adversaries and thus have the negligibility definition
instead of equality for memory distributions.
D. Canonical Representations
Canonically (or uniquely) represented data structures have the
property that each ADT state has a unique memory represen-
tation. Unique representation implies that the ADT and data
structure state transition graphs are isomorphic8. Canonically
represented data structures give very strong guarantees for
history independence and in many cases are the only way to
achieve history independence.
We first define canonically represented data structures and
then discuss several important results pertaining to canonical
representations and history independence.
We also summarize (Table II) the scenarios where canonical
representations are necessary for history independence across
all combinations of types of programs, secrecy of random bits,
adversarial computational ability, and the desired notion of
history independence.
Definition 7. Canonically represented data structure
A data structure D implementing an ADT A on a bounded
RAM machine model M is canonically represented if each
ADT state has a unique memory representation, that is, the
mapping m : S → 2S
D
is injective and |m(s)| = 1, where S
8Isomorphism is discussed in Section III-D.
9TABLE II
IDENTIFICATION OF SCENARIOS WHERE CANONICAL REPRESENTATIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR HISTORY INDEPENDENCE. N/A = NOT APPLICABLE.
Programs of M Random bits Adversary History Canonical
hidden from computationally Independence representations
adversary bounded desired needed?
Randomized Yes Yes WHI No
N/A N/A No N/A Yes
N/A N/A N/A SHI Yes
Deterministic N/A N/A N/A Yes
is the set of all ADT states, SD is the set of all data structure
states, and m(s) denotes the set of memory representations of
an ADT state s ∈ S as per definition 4.
1) ADTs with infinite states
The case of infinite ADT states is of particular importance
for canonically represented data structure implementations on
a bounded RAM machine model. Since the bounded RAM
machine model has a finite number of available bits, the
machine state space is not large enough to provide a unique
representation for each ADT state when the ADT state space
is infinite. Impossibility of unique representations clearly sug-
gests that canonical representations for infinite state set ADTs
are not possible in practice since machines with infinite state
space do not exists in reality. This straight-forwardly leads to
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Canonically represented data structure imple-
mentations for ADTs with infinite states are impossible in
practice.
However, prior work [11], [2], [1] has claimed designs for
canonically represented data structures for the RAM model
in direct contradiction to Theorem 1. The contradiction arises
from the fact that prior work has implicitly considered ADTs
with finite state space. Specifically, the ADTs considered have
have fewer states than the the total number of machine states.
2) Cannonical Representations and SHI
Since history independence was first proposed [11], it has been
known that canonically represented data structures support
SHI. An interesting question posed in this context was whether
canonical representations are necessary to achieve SHI. The
question about the necessity of canonical representations for
SHI was answered by Hartline et al. Hartline et al. [6] showed
that SHI cannot be achieved without canonical representations.
Theorem 2. A data structure is strongly history independent
iff it is canonically represented.
Proof. The proof by Hartline et al. [6] builds on the case
that if a data structure is not canonically represented, then
an adversary can distinguish an empty sequence of operations
from a nonempty sequence of operations. In the context of
our game based definition for SHI, we provide an equivalent
proof for the same.
Consider an ADT A and a data structure D implementing
A on a bounded RAM machine model M. Also assume that
D is not canonically represented. Now, Let Q be an adversery
and C be the challenger in our game. Q selects the following
• Two ADT state s1 and s2.
• Two sequence of operations δ0 and δ1; and two sequences
of ADT inputs I0 and I1, such that O(δ0, s1, I0) →
(s2, τ) and O(δ1, s1, I1)→ (s2, τ).
Let α1 and α2 be two distinct memory representations for
ADT state s1. We show that, with this setup, the adverary Q
can distinguish between an empty sequence of operations and
a non empty sequence of operations. Consider that Q selects
δ0 to be an empty sequence of operation and δ1 to be a non
empty sequence of operations. In step 2 of the SHI game, the
adversary sends s1,δ0,δ1,I0 and I1 to C. In step 3 of the SHI
game, C flips a coin and applies either δ0 or δ1 to s1 and
returns the memory representation of the output state to Q.
There are two possible cases for step 3 -
1) C selects δ0 – there is no change in the ADT state and
the corresponding memory representation since an empty
sequence of operations does not cause state changes.
Hence in step 4, C returns α1 to Q.
2) C selects δ1 – the final ADT state reached after per-
forming all the operations in δ1 is s1 but the memory
representation for s1 in this case may be either α1
or α2. In step 4, if C returns α2 to Q, then Q can
correctly predict with non-negligible probability that C
has applied δ1 on s1 to reach α2. This breaks strong
history independence for D.
Canonical representations are not necessary for WHI
In the absence of canonical representations, it has been shown
that an adversary can distinguish an empty sequence of
operations from a nonempty sequence of operations thereby
breaking SHI [6]. If operation sequences are always assumed
to be nonempty, canonical representations are not necessary
[6]. We will define such a slightly relaxed notion of history in-
dependence that permits only nonempty sequences in Section
V-A. We show that WHI is preserved even for empty operation
sequences in the absence of canonical representations.
Consider the WHI game from Section IV-A. The case
in which the adversary selects two empty ADT operation
sequences in step 1 is trivial since empty sequences cause no
state transitions and hence there is no history to be revealed.
Now, consider the case when the adversary selects an empty
sequence δφ and a nonempty sequence δ1 of ADT operations.
Both δφ and δ1 are required to take the ADT from the initial
state to the same end state. Since the empty sequence δφ causes
no state transitions, end state for both sequences δφ and δ1 will
be the initial ADT state.
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Then, in step 3, the challenger chooses either δφ or δ1 and
sends the resulting memory representation to the adversary.
Since the end state for the two operation sequences is the initial
ADT state, the memory representation sent to the adversary
in step 4 will be the data structure initialization state. From
the data structure definition (Section III-C), we know that the
initial ADT state has a corresponding fixed unique memory
representation. Hence, irrespective of the nonempty sequence
that the adversary selects in step 1, the adversary receives the
initial ADT state’s memory representation in step 4. Since
the adversary receives the same representation each time, the
adversary gains no advantage in guessing whether δφ or δ1
was chosen by the challenger in step 3.
ADT states other than the initial ADT state can have
multiple memory representations. Multiple representations for
ADT states does not break WHI as long it is ensured that from
the adversary’s perspective, all representations of the current
ADT state are equally likely to be observed. Randomization
achieves equal likelyhood for all representations of an ADT
state (Section IV-E). In Section III-D we covered the use of
randomization for WHI from the perspective of state transition
graphs. Later, in Section IV-E we will show how to achieve
WHI by randomization in practice. , which can be used for
WHI. For deterministic machine programs (also described in
Section IV-E) WHI too requires canonical representations.
3) Canonical representations and adversary models
Canonically represented data structures are history indepen-
dent in the strongest sense, secure even against a compu-
tationally unbounded adversary [1]. For a computationally
unbounded adversary, canonical representations are also nec-
essary for WHI.
E. Randomization and HI
In Section III-D, we introduced the use of randomization for
WHI from the point of view of state transition graphs.
In practice, randomization is achieved using the machine
programs implementing the ADT operations. An ADT op-
eration o takes the ADT from a state s1 to a state s2. A
machine program implementing o takes the data structure from
a memory representation of state s1 to a memory represen-
tation of state s2. Since each ADT state can have several
memory representations (Section III-D), the program has a
choice amongst all representations of state s2 and picks one
representation as the result of a transition. Starting from a fixed
memory representation of s1, and a fixed input, if the program
takes the data structure to a fixed resulting representation of s2
on each execution, then the program is said to be deterministic.
If on each execution the resulting representation is chosen
uniformly at random from all possible representations of state
s2, then the program is said to be randomized.
To illustrate, consider an ADT operation o and a machine
program p implementing o. Let o(s1, i) → (s2, τ) denote the
transition from ADT state s1 to ADT state s2 using an ADT
input i and producing an ADT output τ . Also, let m(s1)
and m(s2) denote the set of memory representations of states
s1 and s2, respectively. Then, for history independence, the
following must hold for program p:
Pr[p(sM1 , α(i))→ (s
M
2 , β(τ))] =
1
|m(s2)|
, ∀ sM1 ∈ m(s1)
and ∀ sM2 ∈ m(s2).
Here, α(i) and β(τ) are the machine representations of ADT
input i and ADT output τ , respectively.
Randomization here refers to the selection of memory
representations for ADT states and not to program outputs.
A program’s output is the machine representation of the
corresponding ADT operation’s output.
If randomization is used for history independence, then
random choices made by the machine programs must be
hidden from the adversary. If the adversary has knowledge
of the random bits, then from the adversary’s point of view
the machine programs are deterministic. Data structures with
deterministic machine programs require canonical representa-
tions.
V. Generalizing History Independence
SHI is a very strong notion of history independence requiring
canonical representations [1], [6]. Canonically represented
data structures are not efficient [12]. For heap and queue data
structures Buchbinder et al. [12] show that certain operations
that require logarithmic time under WHI take linear time under
SHI. Hence, it is worth to question the need for canonical
representations for history independence. Many scenarios may
not require such a strong notion rendering SHI data structures
with canonical representations inefficient.
Some scenarios that can be efficiently realized by new
history independence notions:
• Hiding evidence of specific operations only. For example,
hiding only the fact that a specific data item has been
deleted in the past, as required by regulations [7]
• A most recently used (MRU) caching or a journaling
system by definition reveals the last k operations. Hence,
journaling and caching require a new notion of history
independence, wherein no history is revealed other than
the last k operations [11].
• Revealing only the number of times each operation is
performed [1]. For example, in a file-sharing application
disclosing file-access counts may be permissible, but not
the access order.
A straight-forward way to define new notions of history
independence is to provide a new game-based definition for
each scenario. However, defining distinct scenario-specific
games can quickly become a tedious process. Instead, we
introduce a definitional framework that can accommodate a
broad spectrum of history independence notions. We term the
new framework as ∆ history independence (∆HI), where ∆
is the parameter determining the history independence flavor.
As we shall see, ∆HI also captures both WHI and SHI. In
addition, ∆HI helps to reason about the history revealed or
concealed by existing data structures which were designed
without history independence in mind.
A. ∆ History Independence (∆HI)
The WHI and SHI games (Sections IV-A and IV-B respec-
tively) are defined over a subset of ADT operation sequences.
For WHI, the adversary is permitted to select sequences that
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take the ADT from initialization to the same end state. For
SHI, the permitted sequences are ones that take the ADT from
the same starting state to the same ending state. The selection
is made by the adversary in step 1 of both the WHI and SHI
games. Hence, the initial selection permitted to the adversary
determines the history that is desired to be revealed or hidden.
By generalizing the selection step, we can accommodate a
broad spectrum of history independence notions. We achieve
the generalization in ∆HI, defined by the following game:
Let A = (S, sφ,O,Γ,Ψ) be an ADT, M =
(SM, sM
φ
,PM,ΓM,ΨM) be a bounded RAM machine model, and
D = (α, β, γ, sM
0
) be a data structure implementing A in M, as per
definitions 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Also, let ζ be the set of all ADT
operation sequences, Υ be the set of all ADT input sequences, and ∆
be a function ∆ : S × S × ζ × ζ ×Υ×Υ→ {0, 1}.
1) A probabilistic polynomial time-bounded adversary selects the
following.
• Two ADT states s1 and s2; two sequences of ADT operations
δ0 and δ1; and two sequences of ADT inputs I0 and I1; such
that ∆(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) = 1.
• A memory representation sM
1
of ADT state s1.
2) The adversary sends s1, sM1 , δ0, δ1, I0 and I1 to the challenger.
3) The challenger flips a fair coin c ∈ {0, 1} and computes
OM(δMc , s
M
1
, Ic)→ (sM, τM), where δMc = χ(δc). That is,
the challenger applies the program sequence δMc corresponding
to the ADT operation sequence δc to the data structure state sM1 ,
resulting in a memory representation sM, and a machine output
τM.
4) The challenger sends the memory representation sM and the
machine output τM to the adversary.
5) The adversary outputs c′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary wins the game if c′ = c.
D is said to be δ history independent if the advantage of the adversary
for winning the game, defined as |Pr[c′ = c] − 1/2| is negligible
(where “negligible” is defined over any implementation-specific security
parameters of the programs in PM).
Function ∆ determines the pairs of ADT states, ADT oper-
ation sequences, and ADT input sequences that the adversary
is permitted to select in step 1 of the ∆HI game. For the
adversary-selected ADT states, operation sequences, and input
sequences, the ∆HI game can be played and the data structure
implementation is required to ensure that the advantage of the
adversary is negligible. Thus, for a given ADT, ∆ defines two
sets,
H∆ = {(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) | ∆(s1, s2, δ1, δ2, I0, I1) = 1},
and
H∆ = {(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) | ∆(s1, s2, δ1, δ2, I0, I1) = 0}.
For all tuples in H∆, history independence is preserved, that is,
neither the ADT nor the data structure implementation reveals
the operation sequence selected by the challenger in step 3.
For all tuples in H∆, history independence is not required
to be preserved since the ADT itself reveals the sequence of
operations used.
A careful choice of ∆ allows us to precisely define both
SHI and WHI, and a broad spectrum of new history inde-
pendence notions. In the following, we illustrate the use of
∆HI framework to define some familiar history independence
notions and a few previously unconsidered notions of history
independence.
1) Strong History Independence (SHI)
We discussed SHI in Section IV-B. Here, we define the
function ∆ for SHI.
∆(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) ={
1 if O(δ0, s1, I0)→ (s2, τ ) and O(δ1, s1, I1)→ (s2, τ )
0 otherwise
For SHI, the adversary’s advantage in the ∆HI game must
be negligible when in step 1, the adversary selects any two
ADT operation sequences that take the ADT from a state s1
to a state s2 producing the same ADT output τ .
2) Weak History Independence (WHI)
Refer to Section IV-B for discussion on WHI, which requires
the following definition of ∆.
∆(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) =

1 if s1 = sφ and O(δ0, s1, I0)→ (s2, τ ) and
O(δ1, s1, I1)→ (s2, τ )
0 otherwise
Since WHI permits the adversary to observe a single data
structure state, the adversary chooses only the end state s2 in
step 1 of the ∆HI game. The starting state on which sequences
δ0 and δ1 are applied is the initial ADT state sφ.
3) Null history independence (φHI)
Under null history independence, a data structure conceals no
history except for the trivial case when the ADT operation
sequences and ADT input sequences selected by the adversary
in the ∆HI game are identical. Example of a data structure
with φHI is an append-only log. We can reflect φHI using the
following.
∆(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) =


1 if O(δ0, s1, I0)→ (s2, τ ) and
O(δ1, s1, I1)→ (s2, τ )
and δ1 = δ2 and I1 = I2
0 otherwise
4) SHI*
The necessity of canonical representations for SHI was proven
by Hartline et al. [6]. The proof by Hartline et al. [6] builds
on the case that if a data structure is not canonically repre-
sented, then an adversary can distinguish an empty sequence
of operations from a nonempty sequence. Hartline et al.
[6] then proposed SHI*, which is defined over nonempty
ADT operation sequences. SHI* data structures were initially
expected to more efficient than data structures providing SHI.
However, Hartline et al. [6] found that SHI* still poses very
strict requirements on a data structure and may not differ from
SHI in asymptotic complexity.
Here, we give the ∆ function for SHI*.
∆(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) =


1 if O(δ0, s1, I0)→ (s2, τ ) and
O(δ1, s1, I1)→ (s2, τ ) and
|δ0| > 0 and |δ1| > 0
0 otherwise
SHI* closely resembles SHI except that the operations
sequences δ0 and δ1 must be nonempty.
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5) Reveal last k operations (Most Recently Used Cache,
Journal)
System features such as caching and journaling by definition
reveal the last k operations performed from the ADT state
itself. Thus, for caching and journaling, we need to define a
∆ function, such that no additional historical information is
leaked from the memory representations other than the last k
operations. We define the new notion as follows.
Let δ[i] denote the ith operation in the sequence δ. Also, let
δ[i, j] denote a subsequence of δ, {δ[i], . . . , δ[j]} with i ≤ j.
∆(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) =

1 if O(δ0, s1, I0)→ (s2, τ ) and
O(δ1, s1, I1)→ (s2, τ ) and
|δ0| ≥ k and |δ1| ≥ k and
δ0[|δ0| − k, |δ0|] = δ1[|δ1| − k, |δ1|]
0 otherwise
The adversary is permitted to choose two sequences δ0 and
δ1, such the that last k operations in δ0 and δ1 are the same.
Other than the last k operations, sequences δ0 and δ1 may
differ. Yet, the adversary should be unable to identify the
sequence chosen in step 3.
6) Operation-Agnostic History Independence (OAHI)
Consider a secure deletion application that wishes to destroy
any evidence of a delete operation performed in the past. That
is, an adversary (by observing the memory representations)
should be unable to detect whether a delete operation was
performed or not other than guessing. In general, any particular
operation may require to be concealed, not just deletes. can be
extended to any ADT operation (not just delete) We introduce
a new notion of history independence that conceals specific
ADT operations. The new notion is referred to as operation-
agnostic history independence (OAHI). A data structure that
is ∆ history independent given the following ∆ function
guarantees operation-agnostic history independence for an
ADT operation o.
∆(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) =

1 if O(δ0, s1, I0)→ (s2, τ ) and O(δ1, s1, I1)→ (s2, τ ) and
o ∈ δ0 and o /∈ δ1
0 otherwise
In OAHI, neither the presence of operation o in δ0, nor
the absence of o in δ1 gives the adversary any advantage in
guessing the sequence chosen by the challenger in step 3 of
the ∆HI game.
B. Measuring History Independence
We have seen that new notions of history independence can be
easily derived from ∆ history independence by defining the
appropriate ∆ function. In this section, we present an intuitive
way of comparing ∆ functions on the basis of the history they
require to be concealed or preserved.
For a given ∆ function we defined the set H∆ (Section
V-A) that represents all combinations of ADT states, operation
sequences, and ADT input sequences for which the adversary’s
advantage is negligible in the ∆ history independence game.
That is, for all members of H∆, history independence is
preserved. One insight is to use the cardinality of H∆ as a
measure of history independence.
Recall from Section III-C that an ADT can have several data
structure implementations. Let D and D′ be two implemen-
tations of an ADT A, such that D is ∆ history independent
and D′ is ∆′ history independent for two functions ∆ and ∆′.
Now, we say that D is more history independent than D′ if
H∆′ ⊂ H∆.
Note that |H∆| > |H∆′ | alone does not imply that D is
more history independent than D′ since an application may be
more sensitive to the history preserved by D′ than the history
preserved by D. Only in the case where H∆′ ⊂ H∆ can we
consider D to be a more history independent implementation
than D′.
C. Deriving History Independence
In order to provide a history independent implementation for
an ADT, we first require the ∆ function to be precisely defined.
Then, a history independent data structure can be designed that
satisfies the ∆ function. Satisfying a ∆ function means that
the adversary’s advantage is always negligible in the ∆ history
independence game. In effect, so far we have approached
history independence as a define-then-design process.
However, data structures have been in use for a long time
and most data structures have been designed for efficiency or
functionality with no history independence in mind. A natural
question then arises – are there any meaningful9 ∆ functions
satisfied by existing data structures?.
A data structure can be ∆ history independent for several
∆ functions. For example, a data structure that satisfies SHI,
also satisfies WHI, OAHI, and OIAHI. Hence, for a given data
structure D finding a ∆ function may not be a particularly
difficult task. It may be more useful instead to determine an
uncontained ∆ function for D. We define an uncontained ∆
function for a data structure as follows.
Definition 8. Uncontained ∆ function
A ∆ function for a data structure D is uncontained if D is ∆
history independent and ∄ ∆′, such that D is also ∆′ history
independent and H∆ ⊂ H∆′ , where
H∆ = {(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) |
∆(s1, s2, δ0, δ1, I0, I1) = 1};
H∆′ = {(s
′
1, s
′
2, δ
′
0, δ
′
1, I
′
0, I
′
1) | ∆
′(s′1, s
′
2, δ
′
0, δ
′
1, I
′
0, I
′
1) = 1};
s1, s2, s
′
1, and s′2 are ADT states; δ0, δ1, δ′0, and δ′1 are ADT
operation sequences; and I0, I1, I ′0, and I ′1 are ADT input
sequences.
We can determine an uncontained ∆ function for existing
data structures on a case-by-case basis. An open question
is whether there exists a general mechanism for deriving an
uncontained ∆ function for a given data structure.
VI. From Theory To Practice
A. Defining Machine States
The RAM model of execution described in Section III-B
consists of two components, the RAM and the CPU. Hence,
the machine state for the RAM model includes bits from
both the RAM and the CPU. In general, the machine state
9∆ = 0 is satisfied by all data structures. Hence, we need to determine ∆
functions that are more useful in practice.
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for a system-wide machine model will comprise all system
component states. A system-wide history independent imple-
mentation has to then consider each individual component’s
characteristics along the interaction between the components.
Providing system-wide history independence is therefore chal-
lenging.
However, in practice an adversary may have access to only
a subset of system components. In this case, for the purpose
of history independence, the machine state can be defined
over the adversary-accessible components only. For example,
history independent data structures proposed in existing work
(Section X) are designed with the RAM model in mind. How-
ever, the machine states considered for history independence
only include bits from the RAM and exclude the CPU.
B. Building History Independent Systems
Various techniques for designing history independent data
structures for commonly used ADTs such as queues, stacks,
and hash tables have been proposed [1]. Our focus on the other
hand is designing systems with end-to-end history independent
characteristics. The difference between history independent
implementations for simple ADTs, such as stacks and queues
versus a complete system, such as a database, or a file system
is a matter of often exponentially increasing complexity.
Fundamentally, any system can be modeled as an ADT and
an history independent implementation can be sought for the
system.
We introduce a general recipe for building history indepen-
dent systems as follows:
1) Model the system as an ADT. For a specific example of
file system as an ADT, refer to section VIII.
2) Select a machine model for implementation. While defin-
ing the machine state identify all machine components
that the adversary has access to and define the machine
state associated with the adversary-accessible compo-
nents.
3) Depending on the application scenario, fix a desired
notion of history independence and the corresponding ∆
function.
4) Based on the definition of ∆, provide an implementation
over the selected machine model. For complex systems,
the implementation will likely require the most effort
since the machine programs implementing the ADT op-
erations must provably ensure that the advantage of the
adversary is negligible in the ∆HI game.
In section VIII, we follow the above recipe to design a
history independent file system.
VII. On A Philosophical Note
At a very high level, the motivation for history independence
can be stated as follows.
For any logical state SL, the physical state SP representing
SL may reveal information about the history leading to SL,
that is otherwise not discernible via solely SL.
So far, we have considered the logical state to be the ADT
state and the physical state to be the underlying machine state
representing the ADT state, that is, the physical state is the set
of all bits of the machine. Our selection of logical and physical
states seems rather arbitrary. We do this specific selection due
to our adversary model, which assumes that the adversary can
interpret information at the level of bits. An adversary, that
can for example, examine the electric charge in individual
capacitors used to represent the bits will require a different
choice of logical and physical state descriptions. A straight-
forward choice would be to consider a bit as a logical state
and the precise capacitor state as the physical state.
The following interesting question arises from this discus-
sion – is history independence only a matter of perspective?.
The short answer is yes, history independence is a matter of
perspective. There is no universal history independence.
To clarify, consider the universe as a whole from the
viewpoint of classical physics. Under the classical viewpoint,
knowledge of current state of all objects in the universe enables
determination of any past or future universal state since the
laws of physics work both forwards and backwards in time.
Hence, the past is never hidden and history independence
is impossible. For example, using the currently observed
movement of galaxies, the past states of the universe can be
inferred up to the very initial moments of the big bang.
Physical phenomena at the subatomic scale is explained
by quantum physics. At the quantum level, the universe
appears nondeterministic. Further, the uncertainty principle
[14] restricts the ability to accurately measure the current
state of a quantum system. Since the current state cannot
be accurately known, it may seem the past states cannot be
determined either and history independence can be achieved
at the quantum level.
However, even at the quantum level history independence
is still a matter of perspective. The perspective is governed by
the interpretation of quantum physics used. Under the many-
worlds interpretation, the multiverse as a whole is determinis-
tic [15]. The probabilistic nature at the quantum level is only
our perception since our observations are limited to a single
universe. A hypothetical all-powerful adversary that can view
the entire multiverse would have a full view of the past and the
future similar to the case of classical physics making history
independence in the presence of such an adversary impossible.
VIII. Practical SHI for File Systems
We now apply our theoretical concepts and results towards
practical history independent system designs.
Our focus is designing systems with end-to-end history
independent characteristics. The difference between history
independent implementations for simple ADTs, such as stacks
and queues [1] versus a complete system, such as a database,
or a file system is a matter of often exponentially increasing
complexity. Fundamentally, any system can be modeled as an
ADT and a history independent implementation can be sought
for the system.
We introduce a general recipe for building history indepen-
dent systems as follows:
1) Model the system as an ADT. For a specific example of
file system as an ADT, refer to section VIII-A.
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2) Select a machine model for implementation. While defin-
ing the machine state identify all machine components
that the adversary has access to and define the machine
state associated with the adversary-accessible compo-
nents.
3) Depending on the application scenario, fix a desired
notion of history independence and the corresponding ∆
function.
4) Based on the definition of ∆, provide an implementation
over the selected machine model. For complex systems,
the implementation will likely require the most effort
since the machine programs implementing the ADT op-
erations must provably ensure that the advantage of the
adversary is negligible in the ∆HI game.
Using this recipe, we design, implement, and evaluate a
history independent file system (HIFS) and a delete agnostic
file system (DAFS).
In Sections VIII-A - VIII-C, we describe HIFS, an SHI
implementation for file systems. In Section IX, we introduce
DAFS (delete agnostic file system). DAFS extends HIFS
beyond SHI to implement new history independence notions.
DAFS aims to be more efficient for scenarios in which canon-
ical representations can be avoided. Further, DAFS extends
functionality and resilience of the FS.
A. HIFS Overview
Existing file systems, such as Ext3 [16] are not history
independent because they organize data on disk as a function
of both files’ data and the sequence of file operations. The
exact same set of files can be organized differently on disk
depending on the sequence of file system operations that
created the set. As a result, observations of data organization
on disk can potentially reveal file system’s history. Moreover,
file system meta-data also contains historical information,
such as list of allocated blocks. Therefore, when observations
of data organization are combined with file system meta-
data, and with knowledge of application logic, significantly
more historical information can be derived, for example, full
recovery of deleted data. It is therefore imperative to hide file
system history.
File system history can be hidden by making file system
implementations history independent. A straight-forward way
to achieve this is to use existing history independent data
structures to organize files’ data on disk. Current techniques
to make history independent data structures persistent require
the use of history independent hash tables [1]. The history
independent hash tables [3] in turn use uniform hash functions.
The use of uniform hash functions distributes files’ data on
storage with no consideration to data locality.
Modern filesystems exploit data locality for performance by
storing logically related data at nearby physical locations
on the storage device. For e.g., blocks of data belonging
to the same file may be stored physically close to each
other to reduce seek time on traditional storage devices with
mechanical parts. This significantly reduces the latency for
file access. Consequently, existing history independent data
structures which do not preserve data locality cannot be used
for practical filesystem design.
In HIFS, we overcome the challenge of providing history
independence while preserving data locality.
Model
We assume an insider adversary with full access to the system
disk. By analyzing data organization on disk, the adversary
aims to derive file system’s history. We assume that the
adversary can make multiple observations of disk contents.
Recall from Section IV-D that thwarting such an adversary
requires SHI with canonical representations. Hence, HIFS
targets canonical representations for file storage.
Concepts
1) File System ADT
A file system organizes data as a set of files. We consider a
file to consist of some meta-data and a bit string. That is, a
file f = {mf , bf}, where mf is the file meta-data and bf ∈
{0, 1}∗. We define a file system ADT using the file type. Refer
to Section III-C for a discussion on ADTs and types.
A file system is an ADT, that is, a pentuple (S, sφ,O,Γ,Ψ),
where
• S = 2F , is the set of states. Here F is the set of all files.
• sφ ∈ S is the initial state.
• Γ = N∪{0, 1}∗∪ (N×N×N)∪ (N×N×N×{0, 1}∗) is
the set of all possible inputs to the filesystem operations.
In other words, the set of all possible inputs is composed
of : All possible inputs to the filesystem close operation
∪ All possible inputs to the filesystem open operation ∪
All possible inputs to the filesystem read operation ∪ All
possible inputs to the filesystem write operation.
• Ψ = Z ∪ ({0, 1}∗ × Z) is the set of all possible outputs
from the filesystem operations. In other words, the set
of all possible outputs is composed of : All possible
outputs of filesystem operations ∪ All possible output
for filesystem metadata.
• The set of operations O = {open, read, write, delete,
close}, such that
– open : S × {0, 1}∗ → S × Z.
– read : S × N× N× N→ S × {0, 1}∗ × Z.
– write : S × N× N× N× {0, 1}∗ → S × Z.
– delete : S × N→ S × Z.
– close : S × N→ S × Z.
File systems including HIFS support several additional
operations. We have included only a small subset of the
operations here for brevity.
2) RAMDisk Machine Model
In Section III-B we introduced the RAM machine model. The
RAM model consists of two components, a central processing
unit (CPU), and a random access memory (RAM). However,
a file system is generally used to store and manage data over
a secondary storage device. Hence, we define the RAMDisk
model which in addition to the CPU and memory also includes
the storage disk.
Definition 9. RAMDisk Machine Model
A RAMDisk machine model MD with m b-bit memory words,
n b-bit CPU registers, and c k-bit disk blocks is a pentuple
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(S, sφ,P ,Γ,Ψ), where S = {0, 1}b(m+n)+c·k is a set of
machine states, sφ ∈ S is the initial state, P is the set
of all programs of MD, Γ = {0, 1}∗ is a set of inputs,
Ψ = {0, 1}∗ is a set of outputs; each program p ∈ P is a
function p : S × Γp → S × Ψp, where Γp ⊆ Γ and Ψp ⊆ Ψ.
MD is initialized to state sφ. When a program p ∈ P with
input i ∈ Γp is executed by the CPU when MD is in state
s1, MD outputs τ ∈ Ψp and transitions to a state s2. This
transition is denoted as p(s1, i)→ (s2, τ).
According to our model (Section VIII-A), the adversary has
access to the storage disk. For the purpose of history inde-
pendence, we need to consider the machine states associated
with the adversary-accessible components only. Hence, from
this point onwards we refer to the storage device state as the
machine state. Since the adversary does not access CPU and
RAM components we permit the CPU and RAM states to
reveal history.
3) File System Implementation (Data Structure)
The objectives of HIFS design are three-fold.
1) For a given set of files, the organization of files’ data and
files’ meta-data on disk must be the same independent of
the sequence of file operations. That is, file system im-
plementation must be canonically represented and thereby
preserve SHI.
2) Despite history independent storage, data locality must
be preserved.
3) The implementation must be easily customizable to suit
a wide range of data locality scenarios.
HIFS is a history independent implementation of the file
system ADT from Section VIII-A1. That is, HIFS is a data
structure D = (α, β, γ, sM0 ) obtained as follows.
• For all n ∈ Nb, α(n) ∈ {0, 1}b. Here, Nb = {x|x ∈
N and x ≤ 2b}, b is the machine word length, and
α(n) is the bit string representing n. For all ts ∈
{0, 1}c·k, α(ts) = ts where ts represents the current
disk state in the RAMDisk model. For all (n1, n2, n3) ∈
Nb × Nb × Nb, α((n1, n2, n3)) = α(n1)||α(n2)||α(n3).
For all (n1, n2, n3, ts) ∈ Nb × Nb × Nb × {0, 1}c·k,
α((n1, n2, n3, ts)) = α(n1)||α(n2)||α(n3)||ts.
• For all z ∈ Zb, α(z) ∈ {0, 1}b. Here, Zb = {x|x ∈
Z and x ≤ 2b}, b is the machine word length, and α(z)
is the bit string representing z.
• γ : O → PM. The programs that we provide for each
file system operation are the key to achieving SHI. We
discuss the HIFS programs in Section VIII-B.
• The initial data structure state sM0 corresponding to the
initial file system ADT state is obtained by initializing
all file system meta-data. 10.
B. Architecture
1) Overview
A file system ADT state contains two pieces of information
for each file – the file meta-data and the file data. HIFS
10File system meta-data includes superblock, group descriptors, inode
tables, and disk buckets map. Refer to [17] for detailed HIFS architecture.
The loading of file system programs and memory management are done by
the operating system.
block  group 0 block group 1 block group Gn
Inode
table
disk
buckets map
disk
buckets
disk
bucket 0
disk
bucket 1
disk
bucket Bn
data blocks 0 - dbn
group
descriptors
super block
Fig. 4. HIFS disk layout.
supports SHI by providing unique memory representations for
each ADT state. To ensure unique representations, we first
select an existing SHI data structure implementation for a hash
table ADT (Section VIII-B2). Then, we re-design the hash
table implementation to endow it with data locality properties
(Section VIII-B3). Finally, we use two instances of re-designed
hash table implementation to store data on disk, one for files’
meta-data and the other for files’ data (Section VIII-B4).
We refer the reader to [17] for detailed HIFS architecture.
In the following we focus only on the key features that make
HIFS history independent and locality preserving.
2) History Independent Hash Table [3]
The SHI data structure of choice is the history independent
hash table from [3]. The hash table in [3] is based on the
stable matching property of the Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage
algorithm [18].
SHI Hash Table: [3] uses the stable matching property to
construct a canonically represented SHI hash table .
The construction in [3] ensures that for a given set of keys,
the hash table data structure state is the same irrespective of
the sequence of key insertions and deletions, thereby making
the hash table data structure canonically represented11.
3) Key Insights
The SHI hash table of [3] can be used as is to organize file’s
meta-data and files’ data on disk. This will yield a SHI file
system implementation. However, doing so does not preserve
data locality, which is an important goal in HIFS design.
Then a key observation in this context is the following. In
the Stable Marriage algorithm each man in M can rank the
n women in W in n! ways and vice-versa. Hence, several
sets of preferences from keys to buckets and buckets to keys
are possible, each resulting in a distinct hash table instance.
Therefore, by changing the preference order of keys and
buckets we can control the organization of keys within the
hash table.
To enable the re-ordering of preferences we re-write the
algorithms of [3]. The re-write categorizes hash table opera-
tions in two Procedure Sets, a generic set and a customizable
set. The generic procedures implement the overall search,
insert, and delete operations, and can be used unaltered for all
scenarios. The customizable procedures determine the specific
11Refer to [3] for proof of canonical representation.
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key and bucket preferences thereby governing data organi-
zation, including canonical representations and data locality.
This new procedure classification and rewrite enables HIFS to
realize different data locality scenarios for the same data set
through modifications of the customizable procedure set only.
The generic procedures and the overall file system operations
remain unchanged. We note that this customization is achieved
while preserving SHI.
Due to space constraints we refer the reader to [17] for
complete listing of generic and customizable procedures for
several data locality scenarios. In this paper we focus on the
scenario of block group locality. Under block group locality, it
is desired that blocks of the same file are located close together
on disk ideally within the same block group.
4) File Storage
File data is stored in blocks on disk. The blocks are grouped
into fixed-size units. Each unit is termed as a disk bucket
(Figure 4). Like Ext3 [16], HIFS divides the disk into block
groups. Each block group contains an inode table, a disk
buckets map, and a set of disk buckets. Each entry within the
disk buckets map has a one-one mapping to the corresponding
disk bucket within the same block group. The entry in the disk
bucket map contains meta-data about the corresponding disk
bucket, such as whether the bucket is free or occupied.
5) Achieving SHI With Data Locality
Existing file systems, such as Ext3 [16] maintain a list of
allocated blocks within the file inode, which renders the disk
space allocation history dependent. HIFS on the other hand
does not rely on allocation lists. Instead, in HIFS, locations
of data blocks are determined using only the current operation
parameters and do not depend on past operations.
In HIFS, the disk bucket maps from all block groups
are collectively treated as a single SHI hash table. Then, to
achieve canonical representations for file system ADT states,
the file system operations are translated in to SHI hash table
operations as follows: (a) Keys are derived from the full file
path, and from read or write offset parameters to file system
operations. (b) The hash table buckets are the disk buckets
map entries. (c) Key preferences are set such that each key
first prefers all buckets from one specific block group in a
fixed order. Then, buckets from the next adjacent block group
and so on. This ensures that with high probability blocks of
the same file will be located within the same block group. (d)
Buckets prefer keys with higher numerical values.
The above translation realizes one data locality scenario
referred to as block group locality. In [17] we demonstrate
several other scenarios such as sequential file storage and
locality based on external parameters.
C. Experiments
A detailed evaluation of HIFS for different application profiles
and data locality scenarios is available in [17]. Here, we only
list partial results (Figure 5) to give a sense of throughputs
that can be achieved under SHI.
We tested HIFS on a file system of size 100 GB with mean
file size 1 GB. The experiments were conducted for different
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Fig. 5. HIFS experimental throughputs. Load factor = space utilization.
load factors denoted by L12. The tests were conducted on
L×100 files. We used 4 KB disk blocks with 8 block groups
and 5120 disk blocks per bucket. The typical inode size used
was 281 bytes and IO size was 32 KB.
The performance of HIFS for read operations is comparable
to read throughputs of Ext3 for load factors up to 60%. For
higher load factors the write operations sustain significant
overheads. This is because as the load factor increases, the per
write overhead to maintain canonical representations increases
exponentially. The overhead is the relocation of existing files’
data when a new file is being written or when a file is being
resized. However, once the write operations achieve canonical
representations with block group locality reads are efficient.
IX. Delete Agnostic File System (DAFS):
Journaling and DAHI
The HIFS implementation (Sections VIII-B - VIII-C) supports
SHI. As seen from the experimental results (Figure 5), for
higher file system load factors, write efficiency is low. This
is because SHI strictly requires canonical representations.
To ensure canonical representations, HIFS relocates data on
each write operation. The amount of data re-located increases
exponentially with the file system load factor. Hence, the write
throughputs are significantly lower for load factors greater than
60%.
Applications that do not require SHI can be made highly
efficient using new targeted history independence notions. In
Section V-A, using ∆HI we have defined several new history
independence notions that unlike SHI, do not require canonical
representations. We have re-designed the file system layer to
support such new notions. Further, we have extended both
functionality and resilience of the file system. The new file
system is called Delete Agnostic File System (DAFS).
Journaled History Independence (JHI). In the event of a
system failure, it is imperative that the file system state is
not corrupted. To ensure this, file systems typically employ a
journal. File system operations are first recorded in the journal
and then applied to the file storage area. If a failure occurs
while writing to the journal, the operations can be ignored on
system recovery. On the other hand, if failure occurs while
writing to file storage, then on recovery the operations can be
re-played from the journal. Thus each write request to the file
12Load factor is the file system disk space utilization.
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system causes two disk writes, one to the journal and one to
file storage.
DAFS Journaling. In DAFS, a separate region on disk is
reserved for a journal in the form of a circular log. The
journal contains information for a finite number of file system
operations, say k operations. Operations are recorded in the
journal in the order in which they are received by the file
system. To restore consistency after system failure, it is
essential to maintain operation order. Hence, the sequence of
k operations recorded in the journal cannot be hidden. The
file storage areas, such as the inode tables, disk bucket maps,
and the disk buckets provide SHI just as in the case of HIFS.
Hence, once a file system operation is applied to file storage
and removed from the journal, its timing can no longer be
identified.
Apparent paradox: why journaling increases efficiency
History independence relaxations that come with journaling
allow significantly more efficient file system operations due
to batching. This is explained in the following.
To maintain canonical representations in HIFS, data is
potentially re-located on each file system write operation.
The frequency of data re-location increases exponentially with
the file system load factor. Hence, for higher load factors,
the number of disk writes for each write request to the file
system is much greater than the two disk writes required
for journaling. Further, the same data blocks may be re-
located several times in consecutive write operations. If write
operations can be batched, then the number of times a data
block is re-located can be reduced by avoiding redundant
moves.
In DAFS, we choose to use the journal not only for failure
recovery but also as a buffer to batch write operations. Write
operations are applied to file storage areas only when the
journal is full. During this process, redundant disk writes are
eliminated significantly improving write throughputs.
A. Delete-Agnostic HI (DAHI)
Regulations [7] that are specifically concerned with irrecov-
erable data erasure and not with other artifacts of history
can be met by systems that support OAHI for the delete
operation. We refer to this notion of history of independence as
delete-agnostic history independence (DAHI). As discussed in
Section V-A6, unlike SHI, OAHI for deletes can be achieved
without canonical representations. Relaxing the requirement
to noncanonical representations presents significant efficiency
benefits.
To make DAFS preserve DAHI only, we first transform the
SHI hash table [3] into an DAHI hash table. Then, we use the
DAHI hash table to organize files’ data and files’ metadata.
1) DAHI hash table
The SHI hash table from [3] can be transformed into an DAHI
hash table as follows :
The hash table insert operation is modified to not maintain
canonical representations. Instead, the insert operation uses
linear probing [9] and inserts a key in the first available bucket.
The SHI hash table delete operation13 alone provides DAHI.
Deletion of a key from the hash table leaves an empty bucket,
say bucket b1. The delete operation then finds a key that prefers
bucket b1 more than the bucket it is located in according to the
the gale-shapely stable marriage algorithm, say bucket b2. If
such a key is found it is moved from b2 to b1 making b2 empty.
The process is then repeated for bucket b2, and so on, until no
key is found for relocation. The net effect of this process is
that a sequence of hash table operations that contains a delete
operation results in the same hash table state as an insert-only
sequence hiding all evidence of the delete.
Theorem 3. DAHI hash table preserves delete-agnostic his-
tory independence.
Proof. Consider the ∆ history independence game for opera-
tion agnostic history independence for deletes played between
a challenger C and an adversary A. The ADT considered here
is the delete-agnostic hash table. A selects two sequence of
operations : δ0 and δ1 such that δ0 inserts and subsequently
deletes an element x from the hash table. δ1 does not contain
any delete operations. To ensure indistinguishability between
the two sequence, the delete agnostic hash table must ensure
that applying both the sequences of operations to the same
initial ADT state should result in the same final ADT state.
Now consider that applying δ0 brings the hash table from
an initial state to a given state s with element x placed at
position k in the hash table. Also consider that δ0[j] = I(x)
and δ0[m] = D(x), that is, the jth operations in sequence δ0
inserts x into the hash table and the mth operation deletes x
from the hash table.
Consider the elements inserted into the hash table by the
operations in δ0 upto the mth operation. We can divide these
elements into three sets as follows
1) A = {y | δ0[i] = I(y), i < j}.
2) B = {y | δ0[i] = I(y), i > j, i < m}. Further, ∀y ∈ B,
y cannot be mapped to position k in the hash table using
linear probing.
3) C = {y | δ0[i] = I(y), i > j, i < m}. Further, ∀y ∈ C,
y can be mapped to position k in the hash table using
linear probing.
The three sets are constructed in a way such that the
elements of the sets are sorted on the order in which the
elements are inserted into the hash table. To illustrate, consider
a set S ∈ {A,B,C} and two elements a, b ∈ S such that
Si = a and Sj = b where Sk is the kth element of set S.
Also consider δ0[p] = I(a) and δ0[q] = I(b). Then, the sorted
property of the sets implies that i < j only if p < q.
When the delete operation for x is executed in δ0, the
elements of A and B are not affected due to the design of
the hash table. Further by construction, once x is deleted, the
first element from C is placed at position k and all other
elements already placed in the hash table are remapped (if
necessary). If C = φ, then nothing is written to k after
the delete. Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , } without loss of generality.
Also let D = {d1, d2, . . . , } be the elements inserted into the
hash table after x was inserted. Once the delete operation is
13For complete listing of SHI hash table operations refer to [17].
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Fig. 6. TPCC throughputs for Ext3, HIFS, and DAFS with file system load
factor. Load factor = space utilization.
executed in δ0, c1 will be placed at position k and the elements
in D will be remapped to positions in the hash table as if x
was never inserted. Since, δ0 does not contain any other delete
operations, the resulting state after applying the sequence of
operations on the delete-agnostic hash table is equivalent to
the resulting state when an insert-only sequence is applied
which does not insert and subsequently delete x from the
hash table. Note that the definition of the ∆ function for
operation agnostic history independence for deletes enforces
the adversary to select δ1 to be exactly such a sequence in step
1 of the game. Hence, applying δ1 to the delete agnostic hash
table will lead to the same modifications to the hash table as δ0.
This ensures indistinguishability between the two sequences of
operations for the adversary and gaurantees that the adversary
cannot with the operation agnostic history independence game
for deletes on the delete agnostic hash table with more than
negligible advantage.
2) DAHI in DAFS
DAFS uses the DAHI hash table for file storage. The DAHI
hash table insert operation is not required to maintain canon-
ical representations. Since the hash table insert operation is
used by file system write operation, the overhead of maintain-
ing canonical representations on file writes is eliminated.
When a file is deleted in DAFS, for each disk bucket
allocated to the file, the same effect is achieved as that for a key
deleted from the DAHI hash table. As a result, no evidence of
a delete remains in the file system state and DAHI is preserved.
Changing the history independence notion from SHI in
HIFS to DAHI in DAFS has significant potential for efficiency.
The number of writes to disk buckets needed for DAHI
is significantly lower as compared to the number of writes
needed for SHI. This is because write operations are no longer
required to maintain canonical representations. As a result,
when disk buckets are allocated to a file, other files’ data needs
no relocation. The relocation of data was precisely the reason
for lower throughputs of HIFS writes.
B. Experiments
DAFS implements two new history independence notions, JHI
and DAHI. Both JHI and DAHI are aimed to increase file
system efficiency. DAFS can be configured to use DAHI and
JHI either exclusively or together. If DAFS is configured to use
.
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF HISTORY INDEPENDENT DATA STRUCTURES.α← LOAD
FACTOR, N ← NUMBER OF KEYS, B← BLOCK TRANSFER SIZE. ALSO, I :
INSERT, L : LOOKUP, D : DELETE, R : RANGE
Data Structure SHI or WHI? Year Ops Runtime
2-3 Tree [20] WHI 1997 I,L,D O(logN)
Hash Table [11] SHI 2001 I,L O(log(1/(1 − α)))
Hash Table [3] SHI 2007 I,L,D O(1/(1 − α)3)
Hash Table [2] SHI 2008 I,L,D I,D → O(logN), S → O(1)
B-Treaps [21] SHI 2009 I,D,R O(logBN)
B-SkipList [22] SHI 2010 I,D,R O(logBN)
both JHI and DAHI, then DAFS uses DAFS journaling IX. In
this case, if the journal contains an entry for a delete operation
then the adversary can learn about this delete from the journal.
Thus, DAFS allows the user to configure the filesystem for
better performance at the cost of revealing a few deletes to
the adversary. In this section, we compare the performance of
DAFS and HIFS.
All experiments were conducted on servers with 2 Intel Xeon
Quad-core CPUs at 3.16GHz, 8GB RAM, and kernel v3.13.0-
24. The storage devices of choice are Hitachi HDS72302 SCSI
drives.
DAFS is implemented as a C++ based user-space Fuse file
system. All data structures, including DAHI hash table were
written from scratch. We tested DAFS on a file system of size
10 GB and mean database size 1 GB. The experiments were
conducted on L.10 databases. We used 4 KB disk blocks with
4 block groups and 512 disk blocks per bucket. The typical
inode size used was 281 bytes.
To experiment for a real-world scenario we use the TPCC [19]
database benchmark. The database of choice is Sqlite. Sqlite
data files are stored using HIFS, DAFS (without journaling),
and Ext3. The BenchmarkSQL tool is used to generate the
TPCC workload.
Each test run commences with an empty file system and
creates new databases on file system storage. The number
of databases is increased until the file system is 90% full.
The TPCC scale factor is 10 giving a size of 1GB for each
database. Throughputs are measured at specific load factors.
ranging from 10% to 90%.
Figure 6 reports the throughputs for HIFS, DAFS, and Ext3.
As per the TPCC specification, throughputs are reported as
new order transactions executed per minute (tpmc). As seen,
the performance of DAFS is up to 4x times better than HIFS
for load factors >50%. Note that the performance of Ext3 is
included as a reference. Ext3 does not provide DAHI.
For load factors ≤ 50%, HIFS and DAFS exhibit similar
performance. At lower load factors fewer collisions occur as
new files are added to file system storage. Fewer collisions
mean that the frequency of data relocation to maintain canon-
ical representations is low at load factors ≤ 50%. Hence,
performance of DAFS and HIFS is similar at low load factors.
X. Related Work
Existing history independent data structures are summarized
in Table III. The data structures in Table III assume a re-
writable storage medium. [4] designed a history independent
solution for a write-once medium The construction is based
on the observation from [11] that a lexicographic ordering of
elements in a list is history independent. However, write-once
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memories do not allow in-place sorting of elements. Instead [4]
employs copy-over lists [11]. When a new element is inserted,
a new list is stored while the previous list is erased. This
requires O(n2) space to store n keys.
[5] improves on [4] requiring only linear storage. The key
idea is to store all elements in a global hash table and for
each entry of the hash table maintain a separate copy-over list
containing only the colliding elements.
XI. Conclusions
In this paper, we took a deep look into history independence
from both a theoretical and a systems perspective. We explored
the concepts of abstract data types, machine models, data
structures and memory representations. We identified the need
for history independence from the perspective of ADT and
data structure state transition graphs. Then, we introduced ∆
history independence, which serves as a general framework
to define a broad spectrum of history independence notions
including strong and weak history independence. We also out-
lined a general recipe for building history independent systems
and illustrated its use in designing two history independent file
systems.
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